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This dissertation defends common-sense views of the mind by com-
bating two widespread tendencies among philosophers. One such tendency is
to eliminate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by denying the existence of or-
dinary mental features. For instance, many think that while we can experience
the shape, color, and texture of a baseball, we cannot experience the time it
takes for a baseball to fall to the ground or the number of times it bounces —
indeed, we cannot experience any temporal features. The other tendency is to
inflate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by positing new and unusual mental
features. For instance, it is almost universally accepted among philosophers
that to allow for the rationality of agents, especially those like Lois Lane and
Oedipus, we must posit guises (or senses, or modes of presentation) under
which agents think.
Against these tendencies, I argue that we can resolve puzzles about the
mind without invoking new features or denying ordinary ones. In chapter one
iv
I confront ‘Frege puzzles’ concerning Lois Lane and show that there several
distinct yet often-conflated issues at play. Moreover, the plausibility of such
puzzles depends on an equivocation between them. Once disentangled, it is
clear there are simple explanations of Lois’ rationality that do not employ
guises.
In chapter two I confront the Knowledge Argument, which aims to
establish that Mary the color scientist learns a non-physical fact upon seeing
red for the first time, and by extension that the mind is not physical. The most
popular responses to this argument invoke special mental features, including
so-called phenomenal concepts, knowledge by acquaintance, and certain mental
abilities. I argue for a simple response to the argument which does not invoke
any special mental features. On the simple response, Mary is simply misled
into thinking she’s learned something when she has not.
In chapter three I confront a puzzle about temporal experience that
many take to suggest we do not experience temporal features. I argue that
experiencing is a process rather than a state (more like running than like
being tall) and that this distinction resolves the puzzle: we experience temporal
features over periods of time but not in virtue of experiencing them at instants
during that time (just as one runs over periods of time but not in virtue of
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Russellianism and Rationality without Guises
In theorizing about the mind, philosophers often invoke a notion of
content. This is perhaps most common in discussions of the so-called proposi-
tional attitudes: states like hoping that the weather cools off, fearing that the
end is nigh, and supposing that it rains later. Indeed, it is the received view
that having a propositional attitude at least partly consists in taking a mental
attitude (e.g. hope, wonder, judgment) to some content.1 Content is in turn
understood as something wholly specified by — and, according to many, iden-
tical to — an arrangement of certain items.2 Of course, this received view still
leaves much to be settled: are propositional attitudes constituted by anything
more than taking an attitude to content? what sort of items figure into the
arrangements that specify content?
A particularly natural answer to the former question (to which many
subscribe) is negative: propositional attitudes are wholly constituted by taking
an attitude to content. Call this Austerity. A particularly natural answer to
1‘Attitude’ is, unfortunately, used both for what one takes to content and for the state
of taking some such things to content. It will be clear from context which is meant.
2This is often elaborated on by reifying contents as abstract entities which have the
relevant items as constituents, then understanding attitudes as relations one bears to such
abstract items. Nothing in this paper turns on whether that elaboration is correct.
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the latter question (to which many also subscribe) is that content is specified by
arrangements of whatever items the propositional attitude is about, and hence
generally by arrangements of ordinary worldly items (e.g. ordinary objects,
events, properties, relations, etc.).3 Call this Russellianism.
The conjunction of these two claims — Austere Russellianism —
thus follows naturally from basic questions about propositional attitudes. It
also helps us make substantial progress towards many of the theoretical goals
at which theories of mind aim, including a naturalization of the mind, a model
of psychological explanation, a simple semantic theory, an ordinary ontology,
and an account of our epistemic access to the world.
Despite this, Austere Russellianism is widely rejected.4 This is often
done on the basis of what I’ll call intelligibility objections, many of which
originate with Frege. Such objections take a variety of forms but are gener-
ally to the effect that Austere Russellianism cannot allow for the rationality
or cognitive explicability of certain individuals, among them the infamous
Lois Lane, Oedipus, ancient Babylonians, and Catiline. This is because, it is
claimed, propositional attitudes can vary in the rational or explanatory work
they do despite not varying in attitude or what they are about.
3One can also get a grip on what a propositional attitude is about as what it concerns,
what the content’s truth-makers are, or (in a more semantic mode) what it specifies, denotes,
or picks out.
4Austere Russellians include Crawford (2004), Fodor (1994), and Thau (2002), though
Fodor later abandoned the view. Soames comes close but at (2006, p. 722) appears to reject
it. Cappelen and Dever (2018, Ch. 1) expresses sympathy for a nearby view. The semantic
analog of Austere Russellianism is, however, fiercely defended. See fn. 6.
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To allow propositional attitudes to do such rational or explanatory
work, philosophers standardly posit so-called guises (sometimes called ‘senses,’
‘modes of presentation,’ or ‘ways of thinking’) as aspects of propositional atti-
tudes. These philosophers either take the content of propositional attitudes to
be specified solely by arrangements of guises (thereby rejecting Russellianism)
or take guises to be additional elements of such mental states beyond taking
an attitude to content (thereby rejecting Austerity). Indeed, the invocation
of guises is so widespread in contemporary philosophy that their existence is
often taken as a datum rather than a theoretical posit (though it is worth
remembering that even Frege took the existence of senses as a posit).5
The reports of Austere Russellianism’s death have been greatly exag-
gerated. Guises are not needed to make rational or explanatory sense of agents.
In fact, there is a perfectly plausible Austere Russellian account of rationality
and cognitive explanation which evades intelligibility objections, which thereby
undercuts much of the theoretical motivation for invoking guises.
In §1.1 I present and taxonomize intelligibility objections and relate
them to another well-known form of objection. In §1.2 to §1.4 I present Austere
Russellian responses to the most prominent forms of intelligibility objections.
In §1.5 I generalize those responses to a systematic Austere Russellian account
of agents’ rational and explanatory status.
5In fact, he originally went without them — see (Frege 1892, pp. 56–7).
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1.1 Austere Russellianism and Its Critics
Austere Russellianism is a thesis about the structure of propositional
attitudes. It is related to but distinct from a more popular view about the
semantic values of attitude ascriptions, namely that they just express attitude
relations to Russellian contents.6 Additionally, Austere Russellianism is neu-
tral on what realizes or gives rise to propositional attitudes, be it relations to
internal representations, having informational files, being in functional states,
or something else. But on Austere Russellianism, if there are such items, mere
differences in them do not make for differences in propositional attitudes. That
is, if two agents have propositional attitudes which differ in how they are re-
alized but not in attitude or what they are about then those agents have the
same propositional attitude. On Austere Russellianism, mere differences in
(say) the internal representations that give rise to propositional attitudes are
washed out at the mental level, just as mere differences in the number of neu-
rons that give rise to propositional attitudes are washed out at the mental
level.
One might object to Austere Russellianism merely on these grounds,
claiming that independent issues of rationality or cognitive explicability it is
clear that agents at least sometimes differ in which propositional attitudes
they have despite their attitudes being the same with respect to attitude and
6 Defenders and sympathizers of this semantic view include B̊ave (2008), Braun (1998,
2002), Braun and Saul (2002), Crawford (2004), Fodor (1990, 1994), Frances (1998), Kaplan
(1989), McKay (1981), Millikan (1993), Salmon (1986), Saul (2007), Schneider (2005), Sider
and Braun (2006), Soames (1988, 2002), Thau (2002), and Tye (1978).
4
what they are about.7 Call these difference objections. If they succeed then
one might reasonably take intelligibility objections to be superfluous. As we
will see, however, not only are the two forms of objection closely related but
the plausibility of difference objections depends on claims about intelligibility.
1.1.1 The Road from Difference to Intelligibility Objections
Both difference and intelligibility objections are perhaps best presented
as concerning cases of a specific sort. The details of such cases vary widely
and in theoretically important ways but for now let us focus on the familiar
case of Lois Lane. Recall Lois’ situation:
When asked to list superheros, Lois says the name ‘Superman’
but not the name ‘Clark.’ When asked to name people who are
not superheros she says ‘Clark’ but not ‘Superman.’ When asked
‘Is Superman the same person as Clark?’ she says ‘no.’ When
Superman is in front of her in his cape and tights and someone says
‘can you point to Superman?’ she points to him. When Superman
is in front of her in his cape and tights and someone says ‘can you
point to Clark?’ she does not point to him.
Both difference and intelligibility objections begin with an alleged datum about
cases of this sort. They go on to contend, on various grounds, that if Austere
7Another influential form of objection to Austere Russellianism concerns thought about
non-existents. See [REDACTED] for an Austere Russellian response to those objections.
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Russellianism is true then that datum is false — that Austere Russellianism
does not recognize this difference in attitudes.
Difference objections generally begin with an alleged datum about the
presence or absence of propositional attitudes. One such objection, couched
in terms of Lois’ case, begins with the following: it is at least sometimes true
that
(Sup) Lois believes that Superman is a superhero
and also false that
(Cla) Lois believes that Clark is a superhero.8
Call this a difference datum.
Austere Russellianism alone is not inconsistent with the difference da-
tum. One way to put the two in contact (which takes a cue from analogous
objections to Austere Russellianism’s semantic analog) invokes certain seman-
tic principles, most prominently Millianism, the thesis that the semantic con-
tribution of a name is just its referent.9 Another way to connect the two
bypasses semantic principles and employs, among others, the claim that the
8‘Sometimes’ encodes variation in, among other things, the context of evaluation.
9Other standardly-invoked semantic principles include i) that-clauses designate contents,
ii) names contribute their ordinary semantic values in that-clauses, iii) the semantic value
of an expression is determined by the semantic values of its atomic constituents and their
place in its syntax, and iv) (Sup) and (Cla) do not differ with respect to their syntax or the
semantic value of any atomic constituents beyond certain substituted expressions. v) the
names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ co-refer.
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relevant propositional attitudes are about exactly the same things. Of course,
the Austere Russellian can attempt to block difference objections by reject-
ing some such claims — by, say, arguing that names semantically contribute
descriptions rather than referents — but I will grant them. Austere Russelli-
anism together with such supplementary claims deliver that (Sup) is the case
just in case (Cla) is the case. This is incompatible with the difference datum.
Of course, (Sup) and (Cla) are at least sometimes both true of Lois as
described: suppose that you and I desperately need to locate a superhero to
save the city and, unlike Lois, we are privy to the fact that ‘Superman’ and
‘Clark’ co-refer; I hear Lois say ‘Superman is a superhero’ and I immediately
report back to you by saying ‘we may have found one! Lois thinks Clark is a
superhero!’ It is not just that we speak this way on rare occasion — this way
of speaking is utterly ubiquitous.10 Given this, one might begin to suspect
that (Cla) is in fact true exactly when (Sup) is — it’s just that sometimes
(Cla) is misleading to say or an otherwise poor choice of words given what
one’s interlocutor will come to believe as a result.
To more firmly establish the difference datum in light of this suspicion,
objectors might appeal to supporting claims about Lois’ case. Related appeals
in discussions of the semantic analog of Austere Russellianism generally fall
into one of two categories: those which concern various (generally intentional
10Analogues of the difference datum clearly fail for other mental state attributions, in-
cluding those of the so-called objectual attitudes: Lois hates Superman just in case she
hates Clark.
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or behavioral) features of Lois and those which concern various (intentional
or behavioral) features of speakers using (Sup) and (Cla). For instance, some
argue for the difference datum by appeal to the fact that Lois assents to
‘Superman is a superhero’ but dissents from ‘Clark is a superhero.’ Others
argue for the difference datum by appeal to the fact that informed, competent
speakers of English sometimes assent to (Sup) but dissent to (Cla).11
In response to such arguments for the difference datum the Austere
Russellian can either reject the supporting claim or reconcile it with their
view.12 Supporting claims like those above — which concern what certain
people do — are easily reconciled with Austere Russellianism. For instance,
it might be that what such agents do is irrational or cognitively inexplicable.
Given this, the supporting claims should be couched in a way that does not
allow for such reconciliations. A natural way to do this is for the supporting
claims to be of the form: so-and-so does such-and-such rationally or explicably.
Of course, the notion of explicability cannot be of just any sort. Austere
Russellianism is a comparatively restrictive view of propositional attitudes
but it is not similarly restrictive about other sorts of features. So it is only
for forms of explanation that employ propositional attitudes for which Austere
Russellianism is at a relative disadvantage. One prominent form of explanation
11See Crawford (2004) for an overview of such appeals.
12Claims about competent speakers appear to generate problems analogous to those gen-
erated by claims about Lois herself: Lois misidentifies Superman and competent speakers
misidentify the content of (Sup). Given this, one would expect the responses to each to
be similarly analogous. Some, e.g. Braun (1998), Braun and Saul (2002), and Saul (2007),
obey this expectation while others, e.g. Salmon (1986) and Soames (1988, 2002), appear to
flaunt it.
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that fits the bill is cognitive explanation. Another is a form of rationalization,
a kind of explanation that requires mental facts as explanans — mere neural,
chemical, or even computational features cannot rationalize any more than
features of electromagnetic fields unless they are themselves mental.
At this stage it becomes clear that the work in these objections is mainly
being done by claims about intelligibility. Assenting to (Sup) or dissenting to
(Cla) are just some among many intentional features evaluable for intelligibil-
ity. Indeed, many philosophers object to Austere Russellianism on the basis of
claims about intelligibility that are independent of such linguistic issues. They
argue that no matter how such semantic facts turn out, Austere Russellians
cannot account for facts about the intelligibility of what agents like Lois do or
do not do. This transition delivers a second variety of objections.
1.1.2 Intelligibility Objections
Despite their influence, intelligibility objections are often underdevel-
oped and the relations among them are not always appreciated. To see the
full range of intelligibility objections it will be helpful to have a more detailed
scenario than the one above. Consider the following continuation of that case:
One day, Lois arrives at the Daily Planet and says ‘does anyone
know where there are any superheroes? I need to find one.’ Ev-
eryone shakes their heads. For unrelated reasons, someone says to
her ‘by the way, Clark is at the courthouse all day if you need to
get ahold of him.’ Lois responds ‘Thanks. And let me know if
9
you hear of the whereabouts of any superheroes.’ Later, someone
says to Lois ‘I just heard that Superman is at the courthouse.’ She
responds ‘finally — thanks!’ and heads to the courthouse.
Plausibly, throughout the case, Lois believes that Superman is a superhero and
believes that Clark is not a superhero. Moverover, before she hears ‘Superman
is at the courthouse’ Lois believes that Clark is at the courthouse and does not
believe that a superhero is at the courthouse. Then after hearing ‘Superman is
at the courthouse’ Lois comes to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse.
As above, it is available to the Austere Russellian to block various intelligibility
objections by rejecting some of these claims but I will grant them here.13 (For
ease of discussion I will assume that co-referring names are intersubstitutable
in attitude ascriptions and that descriptions in attitude contexts are non-
referential. So, I will assume that Lois believing that Superman is a superhero
suffices for Lois believing that Clark is a superhero but does not suffice for
Lois believing that the savior of Metropolis is a superhero.)
Among the most common intelligibility objections are those that em-
ploy alleged data of the following sort (couched in terms of Lois’ case):
(ExpNot) there is a cognitive explanation of the fact that Lois does not
believe that a superhero is at the courthouse before she hears
13A promising strategy of this sort is to reject that Lois does not believe that a superhero
is at the courthouse. In fact, beliefs of that sort are frequently attributed to agents in
situations like Lois’ (cf. Hawthorne and Manley (2012)). That being said, I will set aside
this strategy.
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‘Superman is at the courthouse’.14
(ExpCome) there is a cognitive explanation of the fact that Lois comes to
believe that a superhero is at the courthouse after she hears
‘Superman is at the courthouse’.15
(NoPosBel) Lois is not in a position to rationally believe that a superhero
is at the courthouse before she hears ‘Superman is at the court-
house’.16
(NoPosKno) Lois is not in a position to know that her belief that Superman
is a superhero and her belief that Clark is a reporter are about
the same person.17
(RatCont) Lois rationally believes that Superman is a superhero and Clark
is not a superhero.18
I’ll call claims of this sort intelligibility data. Each corresponding objection
then proceeds, on various grounds, that if Austere Russellianism is true the
14Advocates of nearby objections include Arjo (1996), Aydede (1997, 1998), Aydede and
Robbins (2001), Braun (2004), Devitt (1996), Heck (1995, 2002), and Richard (1990). Clas-
sic discussions of surrounding issues include Block (1986) and Loar (1988).
15Heck (2012) presents an objection in this spirit.
16Claims of this sort and the two following are found widely in the literature on Russelli-
anism but seldom developed at length (though see Heck (2012)).
17Cf. related discussions on reconciling forms of content externalism with varieties of
self-knowledge.
18A related objection concerns multiple beliefs with contradictory contents. Related con-
straints are often imposed on theories of guises, such as the Intuitive Criterion of Difference
(Evans 1982, p. 18) and Frege’s Constraint (Schiffer 1990, p. 252). See also discussions
surrounding Kripke (1979).
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relevant claim is false.19
These intelligibility data form a heterogeneous lot. Fortunately, they
fall into a general taxonomy of available intelligibility data. They are all alike
in being assessments of Lois having some sort of feature. They differ in the
kind of assessment and the kind of feature, both of which vary along several
dimensions. Understanding these dimensions will help make clear distinctions
among seemingly equivalent objections as well as similarities among seemingly
unrelated objections.
The features that figure into intelligibility data are generally intentional
since intentional features are rationally evaluable and admit of cognitive ex-
planation. Such features vary in at least four relevant ways. One dimension of
variation governs what kind of intentional state is being evaluated. Candidates
include belief, action, intention, and judgment.
A second governs whether the feature is, as we might say, positive (e.g.
believing, acting) rather than negative (e.g. not believing, not acting). (B)
and (RatCont) above are of the former sort while the other three are of the
latter.
A third dimension of variation governs whether the feature is a state
19It is worth noting that a variety of extant theories of guises allow for cases that generate
the same problems for them that Lois’ case generates for Austere Russellianism. That is,
these theories allow for cases that are structurally like Lois’ and such that the agent’s
propositional attitudes involve the same guises. For many such theories, Paderewski cases
are of this sort (Kripke 1979). In allowing for this possibility, these views are in largely the
same position as Austere Russellianism with respect to intelligibility objections.
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(e.g. believing, not believing) or a change (e.g. coming to believe, ceasing to
believe). At least (A) and (RatCont) are of the former sort while at least (B)
is of the latter.
A fourth dimension of variation governs the content of the intentional
features. Some, like (NoPosKno), concern metacognitive content. Others
might concern metalinguistic content, such as that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’
refer to the same thing (though none on the list above are of this sort). All
but (NoPosKno) concern contents not about language or mind.20
The kinds of assessment that enter into intelligibility objections vary in
at least four relevant ways as well. One dimension of variation governs whether
the assessment originates from a normative domain (e.g. rationality and rat-
ionalization) rather than from a scientific domain (e.g. cognitive explanation
and cognitive explicability - cognitive explicability stands to cognitive expla-
nation as rationality stands to rationalization). (NoPosKno) and (RatCont)
are of the former while the rest are of the latter.21
A second dimension of variation governs whether the assessment is
couched in terms of explanation (e.g. cognitive explanation, rationalization)
rather than in non-explanatory terms (e.g. rationality, cognitive explicability).
Only the former quantify over explanations. (A) and (B) are of the former
while the rest are of the latter.
20Even if the objects of other intentional states are not contents of this sort, a similar
distinction will apply, e.g. actions directed at one’s mind or directed at pieces of language.
21Being in a position to infer, at least in the relevant discussions, is akin to being in a
position to rationally infer.
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A third concerns whether the assessment is positive (e.g. being rational)
rather than negative (e.g. not being rational). (A), (B), and (RatCont) are of
the former sort while (NoPosBel) and (NoPosKno) are of the latter.
A fourth dimension of variation in kinds of assessment requires more
exposition. The intelligibility data that concern rationality come in two forms.
Some, like (RatCont), are assessments of features that require the agent to
have those features: rationally believing that p requires that one believe that
p. Others, like (NoPosBel), are assessments of features that do not require the
agent to have those features: being in a position to rationally believe that p
does not require that one believe that p.22 Plausibly being in a position to
rationally believe that p is a condition on rationally believing that p. A natural
way to understand the former is as rational permission to believe or rational
possibility of believing.23 A way to understand the latter is as one believing
that p in an appropriate way (e.g. in a way that appropriately takes advantage
of one’s permission to believe that p). As a result, rationality assessments
vary with respect to whether they are assessments concerning one’s rational
permission to believe rather than assessments of one believing appropriately.
There is an analogue of this distinction for cognitive explicability. One
can intelligibly believe that p, which requires believing that p. And one can
be cognitively able to believe that p, which does not require believing that
22These differ in something like the way so-called propositional justification differs from
so-called doxastic justification.
23This also reveals a kind of rational necessity or obligation. As these can be understood
in terms of rational possibility or permission, I will set them aside.
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p. The latter is a kind of cognitive possibility. The former is believing that
p appropriately. As a result, the fourth dimension of variation in assessment
governs whether the assessment concerns a feature being (rationally or cog-
nitively) possible for one rather than one having a feature in a (rationally or
cognitively) appropriate way.
These distinctions generate a multitude of intelligibility objections, not
all of which are worth considering separately here. For reasons of length, I
will restrict my focus to intelligibility objections that concern Lois and belief
that is not about language or the mind. In discussing each, I am mainly
concerned with presenting an account of rationality and cognitive explicability
that either accepts the corresponding intelligibility datum or which provides
an explanation of it being false.
One difference in intelligibility data that results from some of these
distinctions is that between those like (A), (B), (NoPosBel), and (NoPosKno)
which concern (cognitive or rational) unavailablility and those like (RatCont)
which concern (cognitive or rational) availability. These generate importantly
different problems for Austere Russellianism. I begin with the former, con-
fronting objections that employ claims like (A) and (B) in §1.2 and confronting
those that employ claims like (NoPosBel) and (NoPosKno) in §1.3. Then, in
§1.4, I turn to objections that employ claims like (RatCont).
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1.2 “Why didn’t she...?”
I begin with objections that concern the rational assessment of Lois
coming to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse and not believing that
a superhero is at the courthouse.
1.2.1 Coming to Believe and Not Believing
The first intelligibility objections I’ll confront are those which employ
the claim (concerning Lois once she hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’):
(RatCome) There is a rationalization of Lois coming to believe that a super-
hero is at the courthouse.24
To see the force of these objections, consider that, plausibly, had Lois not
heard ‘Clark is at the courthouse,’ rationalization of her coming to believe
that a superhero is at the courthouse would be her coming to believe that
Superman is at the courthouse. Yet on Austere Russellianism, Lois did not
come to believe that Superman is at the courthouse when she heard ‘Superman
is at the courthouse,’ as she already came to believe this when she heard ‘Clark
is at the courthouse.’ This suggests that Austere Russellianism precludes the
apparently ordinary rationalization — not merely because of the time between
Lois coming to believe that Superman is at the courthouse and her coming to
believe that a superhero is at the courthouse but because it appears that
24Our discussion will make clear a response to objections which turn on the claim that
Lois rationally comes to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse.
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whatever mental state Lois forms when she hears ‘Clark is at the courthouse’
plays no rational role in her later cognitive change.
Rationalization, on this objection, is a form of explanation that employs
mental explanans. Rationalization of one coming to believe that p does not,
on this objection, concern the basis upon which one believes that p — that
upon which one bases one’s belief that p. Even on Austere Russellianism,
Lois might base her belief upon something she learned quite a bit earlier.
Rather, rationalization of one coming to believe that p concerns the changes
that prompt one to believe that p. Call this prompting rationalization.
On Austere Russellianism there is a prompting rationalization of Lois
coming to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse. Perhaps the easiest
way to see it is by first considering related cases. The focus of much of the
literature on intelligibility objections has been on cases involving the use of
two names, as with Lois’. But crucially, intelligibility objections do not require
the use of names. In fact, they do not even require that the agent acquires
information linguistically. (Nor do they require that the relevant item be a
concrete object (e.g. Superman) rather than, say, a feature.) To get a wider
view of the phenomenon, consider the following case:
After a long vacation, Henry goes to the parking garage to find
his car. Having forgotten exactly where he parked it, he wanders
around searching. At one point he sees it in the back corner but
because of the poor lighting and odd angle he does not recognize
it and continues searching. Eventually he circles around and sees
17
it again, this time from the other side and in better lighting. He
then heads towards his car, relieved to have found it.
Call Henry’s car Carl. Plausibly, Henry comes to have various beliefs about
Carl in a way that matches the structure of Lois’ case: he believes that Carl
is his car (and has since he bought it, though he would not put it this way),
that Carl is not his car (since seeing it on his first trip around the garage),
and that Carl is in the corner (again, since seeing it the first time around); he
initially (the first time around) does not believe that his car is in the corner;
later (the second time around) he comes to believe this.
The analog of the present objections for Henry employ the claim that
there is a rationalization of Henry coming to believe that his car is the the back
corner. Like for Lois, the relevant rationalization is not that Henry came to
believe that Carl is in the back corner nor is it that he came be believe that Carl
is his car — neither of those are what prompts him to believe. Any proposed
rationalizer which itself requires rationalization regenerates the problem. So
there must be some ultimate rationalizer — something which rationalizes but
does not itself require rationalization — available.
Indeed, there is a perfectly natural rationalizer of Henry coming to
believe that his car is in the corner. We might quibble about the details but
it is clearly related to the visual state he is in the second time around the
garage. A particularly natural ultimate rationalizer is that he saw Carl well-
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illuminated.25 This is a mental features that can rationalize Henry coming
to believe, does not itself require rationalization, and which (even on Austere
Russellianism) Henry only comes to have the second time around the garage.
Of course there are other, non-rationalizing explanations of Henry com-
ing to believe that his car is in the corner. If certain computational theories
of cognition are true then some of these explanations concern the way his cog-
nitive system encodes various pieces of information. This is a realizational
explanation — an explanation of his coming to believe in terms of him coming
to have something that realizes this. The Austere Russellian need not re-
ject such explanations. But they are not rationalizations and do not compete
with the rationalization just given.26 Likewise, there are explanations of why
Henry has the proposed rationalizing mental feature. Since this rationalizing
mental feature does not itself require rationalization, such explanations are
not rationalizations and may concern (say) neural realizers without threat of
undermining Austere Russellianism.
Turning back to Lois, the rationalization of her coming to believe that
a superhero is at the courthouse is not as obvious as it was for Henry. Yet
25Other candidates include his perceptually experiencing Carl to be well-illuminated and
it seeming to him that his car is in the corner as the result of his visual state.
26One gets the feeling that an equivocation between rationalizing and realizational ex-
planations is partly responsible for the widespread invocation of internal representations
and the like as guises. One asks: why did Henry come to believe that the car was in the
corner? A natural interpretation of this question is a request for a rationalization (e.g. he
experienced it to have certain features). Another natural interpretation of the question is
a request for a realizational explanation (e.g. his cognitive system came to encode the in-
formation in the right way). Not clearly distinguishing the two, one offers the answer that
concerns computation while taking the question to concern rationalization.
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there is an analog. The rationalization of Henry coming to believe is related
to his visual state. The rationalization of Lois coming to believe is not since
vision does not play an important role in her case. Instead, it is related to her
auditory state. The rationalization of Henry coming to believe is related to
him seeing Carl. The rationalization of Lois coming to believe is not related
to her hearing Superman. Rather, is related to her hearing something about
Superman.27 In other respects, the rationalization of Lois coming to believe
is like the rationalization of Henry coming to believe. A natural analog is
that she was told that Superman is at the courthouse by the use of the name
‘Superman.’28 This is a mental feature that can rationalize, does not require
rationalization, and which (even on Austere Russellianism) Lois only comes to
have when she hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’. It does not require that
Lois think about which names are used, just as the rationalization we gave of
Henry coming to believe did not require him to think about the lighting.
One might respond to this proposal that the invocation of names heard
demands the invocation of guises — demands that the propositional attitudes
thereby formed are not exhausted by their attitude and what they are about.
But there is no such demand. The proposal merely specifies the details of
Lois’ perceptual state. Differences in the names one hears (or the lighting
conditions in which one sees) often leads to differences in what the resultant
27Henry’s case might have gone similarly: he sees a poorly-lit picture of Carl and then
later a well-lit picture of Carl.
28Other candidates include that she auditorily experiences the use of the name ‘Superman’
in being told that Superman is at the courthouse and that it seems to her that a superhero
is at the courthouse as the result of her auditory state.
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propositional attitudes are about. They also often lead to differences in neural
or computational features. But names playing this role does not demand that
there are additional items which constitute the propositional attitudes Lois
formed, just as differences in lighting do not demand that there are additional
items which constitute the propositional attitudes Henry forms. Seeing in one
sort of lighting can all by itself rationally explain why one forms certain beliefs
and not others. Likewise for hearing something by the use of one name rather
than another.
With the above rationalization in hand we can also respond on behalf of
Austere Russellianism to the intelligibility objections which employ the claim
(concerning Lois before she hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’):
(RatNot) There is a rationalization of Lois not believing that a superhero is
at the courthouse.29
To see the Austere Russellian response to such objections, consider the rat-
ionalization of Henry at first not believing that his car is in the corner. The
form of rationalization at play here is not prompting rationalization as it is not
rationalization of a change. Rather, it is rationalization of a failure to change.
A natural rationalization is that Henry only saw Carl poorly-illuminated. This
is a mental feature that can rationalize him not coming to believe that his car
is in the corner. For Lois, an analogous rationalization is that she was only
29Our discussion will make clear a response to objections which turn on the claim that
Lois rationally does not believe that a superhero is at the courthouse.
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told that Superman is at the courthouse by the use of the name ‘Clark.’ This
is not a name she is unused to (compare Henry: he is not used to finding Carl
in poor lighting) but it is a name she is unused to using when trying to find
out about superheroes.
We can isolate at least three upshots from the preceding discussion.
First, the resources available for rationalization are much wider than one might
have thought — one need not only look at ordinary beliefs. Second, the
rationalizations of agents like Lois and Henry not believing need not be of
the same form. Third, in asking “Why didn’t she do such-and-such?” one
should be careful not to equivocate over the notion of explanation at play.
There is certainly an explanatory role to be played by internal realizers of
propositional attitudes, but such explanations needn’t come in when giving
rationalizations.
1.2.2 Rationalization and Having Sufficient Reason
There is a worry which I suspect underlies many philosophers’ motiva-
tion for pressing the above arguments. It is that the putative rationalizations
just proposed are in fact no rationalization at all because they do not concern
Lois’ reasons to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse. One antecedently
might have thought that if there is a rationalization of one not believing that
p then one lacks sufficient reason to believe that p. Or, put in terms of
rationality rather than rationalization, one antecedently might have thought
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(SuffReas) If one has sufficient reason to believe that p and one does not
believe that p then one irrationally does not believe that p.30
Plausibly, given Austere Russellianism and the above proposed rationaliza-
tions, when Lois hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’ she does not gain a
reason to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse — the proposed ratio-
nalizations do not specify one nor make salient what one would be. Since Lois
has sufficient reason to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse after she
hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’ she must have sufficient reason before
hearing this as well. So by (SuffReas) Lois irrationally does not believe that
a superhero is at the courthouse and hence there is no rationalization of her
not believing.31
Fortunately for the Austere Russellian, there are clear counter-examples
to (SuffReas). Consider the following case:
Hannah craves a salty treat — a pretzel, some salted peanuts, even
popcorn would do — but believing that there is nowhere nearby
for her to get one she turns her attention to other matters. Later,
she has a conversation about the gentrification of the surrounding
neighborhood and it is mentioned that there are now three bars, a
pizzeria, and a pretzel shop within walking distance. But Hannah
30Cf. Broome (1999, 2013). Related issues arise in debates surrounding the uniqueness
thesis.
31The objection from Graeme Forbes discussed at Braun (2000, fn. 36) has a somewhat
similar flavor to this objection. I think it is susceptible to a response similar to the one
below.
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does not then go get a pretzel. Later, she suddenly exclaims ‘wait
a second, I could have gotten a salty treat this whole time!’ and
leaves to get one.
After the conversation Hannah believes that pretzels are salty treats and that
there are pretzels around the corner. It might be very important to Hannah
that she get a salty treat and she might have nothing better to do. She is not
a particularly absent-minded person — this sort of thing happens to us all.
Yet she does not (say) believe that there are salty treats around the corner,
despite apparently having sufficient reason to do so. Hannah appears no less
rational than Lois. Yet by (SuffReas) she irrationally does not believe that
there are salty treats around the corner.
For another counterexample to (SuffReas), consider formal logician Jon
who foolheartedly attempts to do a proof after a long and draining day. Jon
knows that what he’s trying to prove is of form Z, he knows that the claims
he’s already proved are of X and Y , and (being a trained logician) he knows
that sentences of form X and Y jointly entail sentences of the form Z. Yet he
does not come to believe that he can finish the proof, despite having sufficient
reason to. He is not particularly irrational — he’s simply too tired to think
clearly. He just does not see it. Yet by (SuffReas) he irrationally does not
believe that he can finish the proof.
An additional counter-example to (SuffReas) is Henry’s case. Henry
does not gain a reason to believe that his car is in the corner when he sees
Carl the second time around. Since he has sufficient reason to believe that
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his car is in the corner after he sees Carl the second time, he must have had
sufficient reason before as well. So, by (SuffReas), Henry irrationally does not
believe that his car is in the corner and hence there is no rationalization of
him not believing so. But clearly there is such a rationalization.
Henry and Lois are in a position similar to that of Jon and Hannah. In
fact, if anything Lois and Henry are better off with respect to rationality as
they have better excuses for not believing: it is much more difficult for Lois
and Henry to discover their errors than it is for Hannah and Jon to discover
their own.
(Perhaps despite all this (SuffReas) is true and Hannah and Jon ir-
rationally do not believe. One would not outright accuse Hannah or Jon of
being irrational, of course, but one must recognize a difference between being
irrational and it being appropriate and worth the effort to point out that one
is irrational. And perhaps even the same is true of Henry. If so, it is little
surprise that Lois is the same and no cost for Austere Russellianism to allow
so.32)
One might attempt to improve the present response to the proposed
rationalizations by modifying (SuffReas) in a way that applies to Lois but not
Hannah and Jon. There are of course many ways of distinguishing them —
the task is to find a difference that generates a true principle. One might add
to the antecedent of (SuffReas) that the agents consider the relevant claims
32Millikan (1993, esp. 289-90) makes a distinction between theories of rationality that is
related to the distinction between those that accept (SuffReas) and those that deny it.
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all at once. But such a principle will still apply to Jon as well as to a version
of Hannah. One might add to the antecedent that one be in a position to
rationally believe that p. But this also applies to Hannah and Jon, even more
clearly than it does to Lois.
One might take a different tack and add to the antecedent that the
agents be ideal in a certain respect: Hannah and Jon cannot be ideal given
the details of the case while Lois could be ideal consistent with the details of
her case. For instance, one could, so to speak, fix Hannah and Jon so that
they do not get into situations of their sorts whereas one could not fix Lois so
that she does not get into at least some situations of her sort. Given this, so
goes the response, their rational status is different.
Set aside whether adding this to the antecedent generates a true princi-
ple. It is true that you could not get Lois to avoid all scenarios like the one in
which she finds herself (at least without preventing her from doing anything
at all). This is because you could not, so to speak, build a system that is
perfectly sensitive to the sameness of features in the world. But likewise, you
could not get Jon and Hannah to avoid all situations of their sort either. Jon
and Hannah fail, as we might say, to put two and two together. That is, they
fail to be appropriately sensitive to the relevant sameness of information they
possess. And for the same reason you cannot build something that is perfectly
sensitive to the sameness of external items, you cannot build something that
is perfectly sensitive to the sameness of internal items.
One might instead object that there is no non-trivializing view of ra-
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tionality on which (SuffReas) is false, so it must be true. In fact there is a
quite defensible view which denies it, to which we now turn.
1.2.3 Rationalization and Cognitive Explanation
A natural view of rationalization on which (SuffReas) is false is one
which assimilates it to notions of explanation in the special sciences. It will be
easiest to understand this view by considering special science generalizations.33
This has the added benefit of allowing us to respond to intelligibility objections
that employ claims about cognitive explicability.
Consider the generalization
(Salty) If one wants a salty treat and believes that there are salty treats around
the corner then ceteris paribus one will go around the corner.
This is a generalization of cognitive psychology. It is ceteris paribus, i.e. it
allows for tolerable exceptions: cases which satisfy the antecedent but not the
consequent and yet are consistent with the generalization.
Tolerable exceptions to generalizations like (Salty) are of two sorts.
Those of one sort are still intelligible by the relevant science. For instance,
someone who satisfies the antecedent of (Salty) but has more important things
to do or believes that they cannot easily get around the corner will generally be
a tolerable exception to (Salty). However, other generalizations from cognitive
33For proposals related to the one here, though which still avert to guises, see Braun
(2000) and Schneider (2005).
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psychology will capture such agents,including: if one wants a salty treat and
believes that there are salty treats around the corner but believes that one
cannot easily get around the corner then ceteris paribus one will not go around
the corner.34
Tolerable exceptions of the other sort are those not capturable by the
relevant science. Only generalizations of some other science — usually con-
cerning realizing features — can capture such cases. Someone who satisfies the
antecedent of (Salty) but has an aneurysm and does not go around the corner
is this kind of tolerable exception. Only a principle invoking neurological fea-
tures can capture such an agent. Tolerable exceptions of this kind are said to
be unintelligible from the perspective of the original science and to exhibit a
kind of pathology.35
In light of this distinction in tolerable exceptions, we can more infor-
matively articulate (Salty) as
(Salty*) If one wants a salty treat and believes that there are salty treats
around the corner and one does not go around the corner then ceteris
34This generalization captures that particular tolerable exception to (Salty) but does so
at the expense of decreased generality. It cannot explain the action of someone who satisfies
its antecedent but decides to take the chance anyway, nor can it explain the actions of agents
who do not believe that they cannot easily get around the corner. Such is the nature of
special science explanation: increased accuracy brings decreased breadth.
35It is sometimes claimed that this kind of tolerable exception must be relatively rare. I
disagree. Many true special science generalizations are in fact rarely followed. The ideal gas
law is almost never obeyed exactly. The generalization ‘if one flips a coin n times, the coin
comes up heads n/2 times’ is never followed when n = 1, only followed half the time when
n = 2, never followed when n = 3, only followed three eights of the time when n = 4, etc.
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paribus one unintelligibly does not go around the corner.
Tolerable exceptions to (Salty) that are capturable within cognitive psychol-
ogy are also tolerable exceptions to (Salty*). Tolerable exceptions to (Salty)
that are not capturable within cognitive psychology obey (Salty*) and exhibit
unintelligibility.
(Salty*) is almost the same in form as (SuffReas). In light of this, a
natural thought is that principles concerning rationality are akin to principles
of the special sciences and that if there is any true principle in the vicinity of
(SuffReas) it is ceteris paribus, like
(SuffReas*) If one has every reason to believe that p and one does not believe
that p then ceteris paribus one irrationally does not believe that
p.
A straightforward development of this thought is that rationalization and ex-
planation in the special sciences are analogously structured, with the former
involving principles like (SuffReas*) and the latter generalizations like (Salty*).
On a view of this sort, the rationalization previously articulated of Lois not
believing that a superhero is at the courthouse is a specification of what makes
Lois a tolerable exception to (SuffReas*).
On such views, rationalization is closely related to cognitive and folk
psychological explanation. This puts us in a position to confront additional
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intelligibility objections, namely those that employ (A) and (B) from §1.1.2.36
Folk cognitive psychology certainly recognizes the rationalizations that we’ve
given for Henry as well as the analogues that we’ve given for Lois. So just
as the rationalizations we’ve given for Lois exempt her from (SuffReas*), so
too do they exempt her from an analog of (SuffReas*) couched in terms of
cognitive explicability.
1.3 Being in a Position to Rationally Believe
We’ve so far seen responses to several intelligibility objections, all con-
cerning (rational or cognitive) assessments of features Lois has. Those re-
sponses reconcile the relevant intelligibility datum with Austere Russellian-
ism. This might suggest that Austere Russellian responses to intelligibility
objections always take the form of reconciliations of the relevant intelligibility
datum. Not so. At least some forms of intelligibility objections that turn on
an agent being in a position to rationally or explicably believe employ alleged
data that are false.37 Consider, for instance, intelligibility objections that
36For responses to such objections consistent with Russellianism see Braun (2001) and
Schneider (2005).
37There are a variety of surrounding notions in which related objections are sometimes
couched: being rationally entitled to believe, being rationally permitted to believe, having
reason to believe, being able to rationally believe, and being such that one could rationally
believe. Though these notions differ, they fall into two relatively clear groups. Those of
one group are kinds of rational allowance or entitlement (e.g. ‘is rationally permitted to,’ ‘is
rationally entitlement to,’ ‘has reason to’). Those of the other group are kinds of rational
capacity (e.g. ‘could rationally believe,’ ‘is able to rationally believe,’ one reading of ‘is in a
position to rationally believe’). Plausibly, the former is necessary but not sufficient for the
latter. The points made below at least apply to the former.
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employ the claim
(NoPosBel) Lois is not in a position to rationally believe that a superhero is at
the courthouse before she hears ‘Superman is at the courthouse’.
It is not always clear what the evidence for (NoPosBel) is meant to be. One
consideration given in its favor is that were Lois to come to believe that a
superhero is at the courthouse at that time in her present state, she would
not do so rationally. Of course, the truth of a counter-factual like this is
not sufficient for claims like (NoPosBel). It might be that the basis upon
which one would believe are different than those that put one in a position to
rationally believe. To distinguish those cases from Lois’, the counter-factual
should specify the basis upon which one believes as well, as in
(WereBel−) If one is in a position to rationally believe that p on the basis of
q, r, s, ... then were one to believe that p on the basis of q, r, s, ...
in one’s present state one would rationally believe that p.
Yet this is still not enough. Some agents are rationally entitled to believe that
p on some basis and yet were they to believe it on that basis they would do so
by employing a non-rationally entitling method.38 To distinguish agents like
these from Lois the counter-factual must also specify the method employed:
38Views of what counts as a rationally entitling method vary. Candidates include the
employment of elementary valid forms of inference, reliable belief-forming faculties, and
meaning-constituting inferential capacities.
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(WereBel+) If one is in a position to rationally believe that p on the basis of
q, r, s, ... then were one to believe that p on the basis of q, r, s, ...
in one’s present state and by employing a rationally entitling
method one would rationally believe that p.
Yet (WereBel+) also does not distinguish Lois from other entitled agents be-
cause Lois obeys the relevant counter-factual.
To see this, consider again the formal logician Jon. He also violates the
counter-factual in (WereBel−) and obeys the counter-factual in (WereBel+).
Given his beliefs about the form of the claims he’s proved, the form of his
hoped-for conclusion, and there being an entailment relation between claims
of those forms, Jon is in a position to believe that he can complete the proof.
Yet were he to believe that he can complete the proof in his present state
(tiredness and all) even on the basis of those beliefs he would not rationally
believe that p. Given how tired he is, if he were to form that belief on that
basis (or any other) it would not be by using a rationally entitling method.
Yet unlikely as it is, were he to believe that he can complete the proof in his
present state on the relevant basis and by using a rationally entitling method,
he would rationally believe that he can complete the proof.
Lois is just the same. Were she to believe that a superhero is at the
courthouse on the basis of the relevant claims in her present state she would not
use a rationally entitling method. Yet she has the information she needs, and
unlikely as it is, were she to believe that a superhero is at the courthouse on the
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basis of the relevant claims in her present state and do so via rationally entitling
method, she would rationally believe that a superhero is at the courthouse.
She will not do that, of course, and we should not expect her to. But she
nevertheless is in a position to. We (incorrectly) thought that Lois is not in
a position to rationally believe on the basis of (correctly) thinking that she
wouldn’t rationally believe it even if she did so on the right basis.
Like Jon, Lois falsifies the counter-factual in (WereBel−) but not the
one in (WereBel+). Agents like Lois, just as those like Jon, have a difficult
time rationally believing. And being epistemically responsible agents, they will
not believe via a non-rationally entitling method. But they are still rationally
entitled to believe. This is an unfortunate situation for them but not an
unusual consequence of Austere Russellianism as situations of this sort are
commonplace.
Analogous claims hold for intelligibility objections that turn on claims
of being in a position to explicably believe that a superhero is at the court-
house. Lois has the information she needs, just as Jon does. But she will not
form the belief, and like Jon (and Henry and Hannah), she has a perfectly
good excuse for not doing so.
1.4 Contradictory Beliefs
To conclude our whirlwind tour of intelligibility objections, let us con-
sider those that turn on claims such as that Lois is in a position to rationally
believe that Superman is a superhero and Clark is not a superhero, or, more
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strongly,
(RatCont) Lois rationally believes that Superman is a superhero and Clark
is not a superhero.
(Analogues of these concerning cognitive explicability are not normally given.)
Intelligibility objections that employ (RatCont) are not often spelled out in
detail but the objectors often allege a rational prohibition on having con-
tradictory beliefs, or a weaker prohibition on contradictory beliefs in select
circumstances that include Lois’. (One should tread carefully here. It may be
a norm of rationality that one not have contradictory beliefs. But the move
from this to the prohibition on rational belief is substantial step. Compare
going from it being a norm of morality that one not break one’s promises to
it never being moral to break one’s promises.)
Objections that turn on claims like (RatCont) generate importantly
distinct issues from those generated by the objections we’ve already discussed.
The issue raised by the intelligibility data discussed in §1.2 and §1.3 was that
Austere Russellianism makes (cognitively or rationally) available certain inten-
tional features that should be unavailable. The issue raised by (RatCont), on
the other hand, is that Austere Russellianism makes (rationally) unavailable
certain intentional features that should be available.
Austere Russellians can allow that (RatCont) is true. An initial way to
see this is by noting that on the view of rationality proposed here, rationality
and rationalization are closely related to cognitive explanation. Since contra-
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dictory beliefs are cognitively explicable, we should expect that they admit of
rationalization as well.
Another way to see why these objections fail is by noting that there are
cases which both bear a striking resemblance to Lois’ and plausibly concern
agents that rationally hold logically incompatible beliefs. The preface paradox
provides one. Agents in preface paradox cases apparently rationally believe,
say, of each claim made in a book that it is true, of the claims made in the
book that they are all the claims made in the book, and that not all claims
made in the book are true. Indeed, such agents might even know that their
beliefs are inconsistent and yet rationally maintain them.
One might worry that it is plausible that preface paradox agents believe
rationally because they have attitudes concerning a sufficiently large number
of claims. Since Lois has attitudes concerning only two claims, one might take
preface paradox lessons to not apply to Lois. On the contrary, there are cases
in which agents have a small number of logically inconsistent and yet plausibly
rational beliefs. Gilbert Harman discusses cases in which an agent becomes
aware of a conflict in their beliefs but because each is practically important
and they do not have the time to resolve the inconsistency when they notice
it, resolves to keep the inconsistency temporarily until it can be resolved.39
(In fact, if anything Lois is in a better position with respect to rationality
than those in many Harman-style and preface paradox cases since unlike those
39Harman (1986, pp. 15–6).
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agents, Lois does not know that her beliefs are inconsistent and, indeed, ratio-
nally believes that they are not.) Other cases of agents with rational beliefs
concerning a small number of logically inconsistent claims include those of
certain logicians who deny true logical principles. For instance, it is rational
for Vann McGee to accept the premises of his famous alleged counter-example
to modus ponens while denying the conclusion, even if modus ponens is valid
and his alleged counter-example is an instance of modus ponens.40 Versions of
Hannah and Jon also provide clear cases of this. Hannah might, on general
inductive grounds, rationally come to believe that there are no pretzels around
the corner and Jon might likewise rationally come to believe that his hoped-for
conclusion does not follow from the premises. Henry provides another case:
he might well rationally form the conjunctive belief that Carl is his car and
Carl is not his car.
One feature of these cases is that the agent’s reasons for holding the
relevant beliefs originate from distinct sources. For instance, in preface para-
dox cases: reasons for believing of each claim made in the book that it is true
originate from evidence concerning the subject-matter of the book; reasons for
believing of the claims made in the book that they are all the claims made
in the book originate from having read the book; and reasons for believing
that not all claims made in the book are true originate from evidence of one’s
fallibility. Similarly with McGee and Henry. It is this detail that, at least
in part, seems to motivate the rationality judgment. Interestingly, just this
40McGee (1985).
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feature is present in Lois’ case. Her reasons for believing that Superman is
a superhero originate from quite a different source (e.g. from her seeing him
fly around) than her reasons for believing that Clark is not a superhero (e.g.
from her knowing that reporters are generally not superheros). Lois’ case pat-
terns with those that constitute a data point for theories of rationality. (Or
perhaps despite all this McGee, Harman’s agent, Hannah, Jon, Henry, and
those in preface paradox cases do not rationally believe what they do. If so,
it is no surprise that Lois is included among them and no cost for Austere
Russellianism to allow so.)
1.5 Conclusion
The general view of rationality and cognitive explicability defended
here is one on which Lois is very much like Hannah, Jon, and McGee. These
agents are all in a position to rationally and explicably believe their respective
claims: for Hannah, that there are salty treats around the corner; for Jon,
that he can finish the proof; for McGee, the conclusion of the alleged counter-
example to modus ponens. Yet these agents rationally and explicably do not
form such beliefs as they have rationalizing excuses for not doing so. And these
agents (or versions of them) rationally have contradictory beliefs, as they have
independent reason to believe each of the jointly contradictory claims.
The account defended here can be generalized to intelligibility objec-
tions that concern metacognitive and metalinguistic beliefs. For instance, a
similar account can be given regarding the fact that Lois is in a position to ra-
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tionally believe that her beliefs are about the same thing, though she rationally
does not believe so and indeed rationally believes that her beliefs are about
different things. We can also generalize the present account to intelligibility
objections that concern intentional features besides belief, such as action or
knowledge. In fact, some of the intelligibility objections discussed above do
not have plausible analogues for other mental features. For instance, analogues
of objections that concern having contradictory beliefs do not obviously arise
for action (as one cannot perform incompatible or impossible actions) nor for
knowledge (as one cannot know something contradictory).
An upshot of our discussion is that the motivation for imposing guises is
much like the motivation for invoking an epistemological given. It is tempting
to think that when one is in a position to infer something on the basis of other
claims, this relation is laid plain to one, and so some aspect of entertaining
those claims guarantees that this is laid plain. But as with other subject-
matters, such relations are never simply given — agents have to figure it out
like they have to figure everything else out. Sometimes this is easy (e.g. when
one is well-rested, when the lighting does not change, when the same names
are used) and sometimes it is hard.
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Chapter 2
A Simple View of Mary
The mere knowledge of a fact is pale; but when you come to realize
your fact, it takes on color. It is all the difference between hearing
of a man being stabbed to the heart, and seeing it done.
- Mark Twain
Many physicalists respond to the knowledge argument that there is no
new fact or information that Mary acquires when she leaves her room — she
only receives old information. A central task for such physicalists is to explain
or explain away various facts about Mary that look quite unusual if she does
not acquire any new information. I argue that there is a simple physicalist
account of Mary that does not invoke any special mental features.
2.1 The Big Reveal
Since the case of Mary the color scientist is familiar to most, I will give
it briefly.1 Mary is the foremost expert on color and color experience. She
eventually comes to possess all the physical information in her chosen areas of
1The case comes from Jackson (1982).
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study. However, Mary has spent her entire life in a black and white room and
she has only ever visually experienced things to be black, white, and shades
of gray. One day she exits the room and sees a red apple. How incredible! she
exclaims.
Many have been tempted by the thought that when she sees the apple,
Mary receives some new information — information she did not have in the
room — about color or color experience. This observation, or one like it,
is employed in arguments against physicalism.2 These arguments vary in a
variety of ways but a particularly clear version goes as follows:
(P1) All physical information about color is such that Mary has it in her
room.
(P2) Some information about color is such that Mary does not have it in
her room.
(C1) So, some information is not physical.
(P3) If some information is not physical then physicalism is false.
(C2) So, Physicalism is false.
This is what has come to be known as the knowledge argument. The
standard physicalist reply to the knowledge argument is that while Mary
2A related but importantly distinct argument concerning Mary turns on questions of a
priori deducability.
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does receive some information upon seeing the apple, all the information she
receives is information she already had in the room (so in this formulation,
(P2) is false).
Those who endorse the standard reply generally don’t rest there, how-
ever. They articulate complex theories of new mental features — e.g. knowl-
edge by acquaintance, practical knowledge, exercising phenomenal concepts
— that Mary comes to have when she sees the apple. It is worth pausing
to see why this is done. The reason, I take it, is that there are certain ap-
parent facts about Mary which suggest that (P2) is true and which, absent
further explanation, look quite mysterious on the standard reply. Among the
most widely discussed of such claims are that Mary comes to know something,
that she comes to know a new fact, that she gains some knowledge, that she
gains some propositional knowledge, that she learns something, that she learns
something propositional, that she learns a new fact, that she makes a discov-
ery, that she discovers something, that she discovers some information, and
that she makes epistemic progress. Much of the literature on the knowledge
argument focuses on which of these claims are true and which mental features
best allow advocates of the standard reply to reconcile them with the falsity
of (P2).
Though many of those claims are plausible they are not beyond ques-
tion. There are, however, certain claims about Mary which are even more
obvious and which, absent further explanation, still look mysterious on the
standard reply. One of the most basic of such claims is that upon seeing the
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apple, at least some of the information Mary receives strikes her as new (or,
more or less, that some such information seems new to her). Indeed, in some
respect it is unavoidable that upon seeing the apple, the information Mary
receives strikes her as new. Even if Mary is cognitively ideal — e.g. has per-
fect working and long-term memory and flawless reasoning abilities — this
will still be the case. Granted, there are things that would change Mary in
this regard: one could, for instance, reconfigure her cognitive system to be like
that of someone who has had many experiences of red. But holding fixed that
Mary is ordinary in the ways allowed by the case, upon seeing the apple the
information she receives will strike her as new.
In this respect Mary is quite unlike someone in ordinary circumstances
who knows that p and then later is, say, told that p. Suppose one learns from
the news that it will rain this evening and then is told by a coworker that it
will rain this evening. In all likelihood, upon being told so by one’s coworker
this information will not strike one as new. Absent further explanation, the
difference between such agents and Mary looks quite mysterious. Thus, it
seems a basic task for the advocate of the standard reply is to explain:
(Strike) upon seeing the apple, Mary receives old information that strikes
her as new.
Absent such an explanation, the standard reply appears largely unmotivated.3
3To be sure, not even (Strike) is completely obvious. Certainly something strikes Mary
as new but that information strikes her as new is not completely obvious. Still, I will assume
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In fact, there is a simple explanation of (Strike) which does not require
appeal to special mental features. Moreover, that explanation undermines
our reasons for thinking that the more controversial claims taken to motivate
(P2) are true, thereby undermining the motivation for invoking special mental
features to defend the standard reply. In the next section we see the simple
explanation of (Strike) and then in §2.3 apply it to other seemingly mysterious
facts about Mary.
2.2 Explanations of (Strike)
The extant version of the standard reply best equipped to explain
(Strike) is also perhaps the most popular version of the standard reply: the
so-called phenomenal concept view. Advocates of this view claim that one
can receive information — and entertain, believe, and know that information
— via different concepts. Moreover, differences in the concept one employs
can make for important differences in one’s mental life. For instance, if one
receives information via one concept and then again via another that informa-
tion will likely strike one as new, whereas employing the same concept both
times will likely not result in the information striking one as new. In addition
to this, advocates of the phenomenal concept view hold that there is a concept
Mary did not (and given the setup, could not) acquire in her room. She only
came to employ that concept upon seeing the apple, because to possess the
concept one must have a certain sort of experience. On this proposal, the ex-
this.
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planation of why the information Mary receives upon seeing the apple strikes
her as new is that upon seeing the apple Mary comes to employ a new concept
in receiving that information.
Cases in which old information strikes one as new are widespread. The
most tempting form of explanation of why old information strikes one as new
in such cases is of a piece with the phenomenal concept explanation: the agent
employs a new concept in receiving the old information. Yet there is another
kind of explanation of why old information strikes one as new which does not
require one to use a new concept, and explanations of this kind are needed in
at least some cases.
One might doubt that it is possible for old information to strike one as
new when one does not employ a new concept and hence doubt that there can
be an explanation of old information striking one as new that does not require
one to use a new concept. But in fact this is possible. Consider the following
cases:
Sosseh learned years ago that Jon’s birthday is December 4th.
Though she hasn’t thought about it in a year, she can still re-
call it. A mutual friend says to her ‘by the way, Jon’s birthday is
December 4th.’ She responds ‘oh dang, that’s coming up. Are we
doing something?’
Alex has an beginner-to-intermediate level of competency in Span-
ish. He sees on his calendar that his friend Jon’s birthday is De-
cember 4th. Later, a friend rushes up to him with a worried look
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and says with urgency “el cumpleaños de Jon es quatro de diciem-
bre!” He responds with surprise and then, translating what was
said to his native language, realizes that he already knew this.
These are both plausibly cases in which an agent receives old information that
strikes them as new despite them not employing a new concept.4
Indeed, we should expect there to be such cases based on the nature
of psychology. One theoretical role that concepts play is allowing us to for-
mulate true psychological laws. Without relativization to the use of concepts,
apparently true psychological laws like
(A) If one wants that p and knows that φing is a necessary means
to p then ceteris paribus one will φ
appear clearly false. Granted, the principle has a ceteris paribus clause, which
allows for some tolerable exceptions to the principle (i.e. cases which satisfy the
antecedent but not the consequent and yet owing to some special features are
not counter-examples to the principle). But even so, without being relativized
to what concepts one employs, such a principle appears hopelessly strong. So
see why, consider Lois Lane, who wants to find Superman and knows that
going to Clark Kent’s office is a necessary means of finding Clark yet does
4Cases of this sort can be generated in other ways as well, such as from someone mistak-
enly taking one person to be two distinct people and noting the same fact about them on
two occasionsand from an agent having good (say, probabilistic) reason to think that they
were told different information when in fact it was the same.
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not go to Clark’s office. She satisfies the antecedent but not the consequent
of (A) and yet doesn’t appear to be special in a way that would make her a
tolerable exception to it. By building into the law that one must employ the
same concepts in order to satisfy each clause in the antecedent, we can avoid
the problem posed by Lois: she fails to satisfy the antecedent of (A) because
she employs different concepts in thinking about Clark.
Of course, even relativized to using the same concepts throughout, (A)
is not exceptionless. Sometimes one has better things to do than φ or thinks
one cannot easily φ. Such is the case in psychology: there are few if any
theoretically interesting exceptionless psychological laws.5 This is true for
essentially all non-fundamental sciences.
The same goes for laws which relate one receiving old information to
the information striking one as new. For instance, the following is a law of
psychology:
(B) If one knows that p and one receives the information that p then ceteris
paribus the information one receives will not strike one as new.
As a law of psychology, this law admits of tolerable exceptions even when
relativized to employing the same concepts throughout. So, there are cases
in which one receives old information that strikes one as new despite one
5The exception to this is for laws that relate mental states which bear a constitutive
relation to one another, e.g. knowing that p and believing that p.
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employing a single concept. (Any theory of concepts which precludes this
possibility is the worse off for it.)
The proposal is that Mary’s case is an instance of this: she receives
old information via an old concept and yet it strikes her as new. Of course,
this proposal has the burden of explaining (Strike) and hence why Mary is a
tolerable exception to (B). To see that explanation, consider explanations of
the analogous facts about Sosseh and Alex. The explanation for Sosseh is clear:
she received the information at very different times and didn’t immediately call
to mind what she had learned years ago. The explanation for Alex is similarly
clear: he is not yet completely fluent in Spanish and though he understood
what he was told, he did not immediately translate it to his native language.
These explanations appeal to the agents being cognitively imperfect or
lacking some information. The explanation of (Strike) cannot make a simi-
lar appeal as Mary does have all the relevant information and is cognitively
perfect. Rather, the explanation of why, upon seeing the apple, the informa-
tion Mary receives strikes her as new is that Mary is not used to receiving
information via color experience.
Mary is much like Alex, who is told the relevant information in a lan-
guage with which he is only competent. Indeed, Alex might well have known
ahead of time what he was about to be told in Spanish and yet still had the
information strike him as new. He had to bring to bear knowledge of the
relation between English and Spanish to see that it was old information. Like-
wise, upon seeing the apple, the information Mary receives strikes her as new
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because she receives the information in a manner that she is not used to — via
color experience. Granted, being fully informed and cognitively ideal she knew
all along that she would receive old information. Yet still, she has to bring to
bear what she learned previously to relate the information she receives upon
seeing the apple to the rest of the information she has. This is because she
has not yet gotten used to receiving information via color experience. This is
the simple explanation of (Strike).
2.3 Comparing Explanations
We are now in a position to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages
of the simple view. I’ll focus on a comparison with the phenomenal concept
view.
The simple view has one clear advantage over the phenomenal concept
view: it does not incur the burden of articulating a theory of concepts which
one cannot possess except by having certain experience — which are anathema
to our best theories of concepts.
Yet one might worry that the simple view also falters for not positing
such concepts. For instance, one benefit of the phenomenal concept view is that
it can explain other apparent facts about Mary beyond (Strike). For instance,
it can explain the apparent fact that Mary gains new knowledge when she
leaves the room. On a standard extension of the phenomenal concept view,
one can come to know information one already knows so long as one does so via
a new concept. Since upon seeing the apple Mary receives information via a
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new concept, on this proposal she can come to know that information despite
already knowing it. In a similar fashion, the phenomenal concept view can
capture other alleged facts about Mary, including those about her learning,
making a discovery, and making epistemic progress.
On a straightforward version of the simple view, Mary does not gain
new knowledge upon seeing the apple. She likewise does not learn anything or
make a discovery. Yet the advocate of the simple view has a clear explanation
of this: Mary is just like Sosseh and Alex: they may initially take themselves
to gain new knowledge but neither of them actually do so. If we are ignorant
of what concepts, say, Sosseh uses, we might reasonably take her to gain
new knowledge upon overhearing the second stranger. But once we learn
which concepts she employs our reasons for thinking she gains new knowledge
are undermined. She acts as if she gains new knowledge but only because
of unusual circumstance. Likewise, she does not learn or make a discovery.
(Whether she makes epistemic progress is a bit trickier: she acquires more
evidence for the claim that Jon’s birthday is December 4th. In that respect
she makes epistemic progress.)
Mary is the same: before one knows that she uses the same concept
one might reasonably think that she gains new knowledge upon seeing the
apple. But once we learn which concepts our reasons for thinking she gains
new knowledge are undermined. Mary acts as if she gains new knowledge but
only because of unusual circumstance. So, I submit, Mary does not gain new
knowledge, learn anything new, or make any discovery when she sees the apple
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(though she may, like Sosseh, make epistemic progress).
Though the simple view can tackle Mary’s case, one might still worry
that it does not have the same theoretical import to other problems for phys-
icalism that the phenomenal concept view has. For instance, phenomenal
concepts are invoked to account for the existence of an explanatory gap.6 The
simple view appears unable to offer a similar theoretical upshot.
On the contrary, the simple view meshes well with alternative reply
to other problems for physicalism. The explanatory gap, for instance, arises
because we fail to recognize that information we acquire from, say, the lab
and from experience is the very same information. Such a failure of recog-
nition admits of similar explanations to the one given for Mary: we receive
the information from radically different sources. No differences in concepts
needed.






One currently widely held view is that how things are phenomenally
for a subject at a time is constitutively independent of how things are phe-
nomenally for them at other times, and how things are phenomenally with a
subject over a period is exhausted by and less fundamental than how things
are phenomenally with them at each point during that period. The idea is
that what it is like for me right now and what it was like for me at any other
time bear no constitutive relation to each other. Moreover, what it is like for
me over the last five minutes just reduces to what it was like for me at each
point during those five minutes.
There are at least three central motivations for such a view. It is sup-
ported by a version of temporal internalism about the phenomenal as well as
(at least for intentionalists) a Geachean observation about the non-unfolding
nature of mental representation. It is also supported by an emphasis on visual
experience in contemporary philosophy of perception together with an assim-
ilation of visual representation to that of pictures or film. But regardless of
why it is held, the view often forms part of the background theory against
which discussions of experience and experiential content take place.
I will argue here that this view is false. Experience is not static and
momentary in this way. Rather, experience is at least sometimes irreducibly
temporally extended — sometimes undergoing experience over a period is more
fundamental than than undergoing experience over parts of that period. I will
show that this view dissolves a certain longstanding philosophical puzzle about
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temporal experience and allows one to more clearly theorize about certain
categories of the mind.
In the first half of the paper, §3.2, I argue for the proposed view by
considering a puzzle concerning experience of dynamic and temporal features.
In §3.2.1, I present that puzzle. By way of resolving it I introduce and regiment,
in §3.2.2 and §3.2.3 respectively, a distinction between ways of being that
essentially take some time to go on and those that do not. I then show, in
§3.2.4, that this distinction reveals an equivocation in the original puzzle and
that if some experience is of the former sort, the puzzle dissolves.
In the second half of the paper I elaborate the resulting view and re-
spond to potential objections. In §3.3.1, I respond to the claim that on the
proposed view, the temporal features of experience and those presented in ex-
perience must match in certain ways special among all sensory qualities. In
§3.3.2, I respond to to the claim that the view is inconsistent with a Geachean
observation to the effect that mental representation does not unfold succes-
sively. In §3.3.3, I respond to the worry that on this view phenomenal ex-
perience is (temporally) externally determined in certain respects. In §3.4, I
gesture at one upshot of the proposed view, that it can be used to clarify sev-
eral distinctions in the philosophy of mind, including one between occurrent
and non-occurrent mental phenomena.
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3.2 Experience and Temporal Representation
Described most neutrally, the phenomena of interest in discussions of
phenomenal experience are properties of a certain sort — properties of subjects
— that I’ll call phenomenal properties.1 One way to pick out such prop-
erties is as the maximal determinates of the property of being phenomenally
conscious. Put briefly, each phenomenal property is the salient property some-
one instantiates in all and only those cases in which things are phenomenally a
certain way with them. To undergo experience is to instantiate a phenomenal
property. For various reasons, I employ a notion of experiential representation
in discussing phenomenal experience. For clarity, I do so against the back-
ground of intentionalism. On intentionalist views, phenomenal properties are
intentional properties, that of experientially representing such-and-such (i.e.
each phenomenal property is the property of bearing an experiential attitude
to a content). This assumption is independent of the main thesis of the paper.2
3.2.1 The Puzzle
Temporal features are represented in experience. This much is hard
to deny. Even setting aside temporal relations like succession and simultane-
ity, it is quite plausible for dynamic features like movement, crescendo, and
throbbing. There are various ways one might get a grip on the class of sen-
sible qualities, including as those that: figure into the accuracy conditions of
1See Nida-Rümelin 2007; Pautz 2009; Speaks 2015 for some discussion, though many
philosophers employ a similar conception (sometimes calling them experiential properties).
2As shown in §3.2.4
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experience, figure into true appears/looks reports of a certain ‘phenomenal’
variety, could be instantiated by an experience itself, could be instantiated by
sense-data (as classically conceived), or ‘immediately available to introspec-
tion.’ On all of these ways of getting an initial grip on which features are
sensible qualities, temporal features count among them.
Moreover, there are pairs of otherwise similar experiences which clearly
differ with respect to the representation of temporal features. For instance,
when one watches a series of film frames slowly succeeding one another (each
shown for, say, 500 ms), one experiences a series of snapshots. But if the
time of each frame is decreased (to, say, 30 ms), the items depicted seem to
come to life and one can no longer visually identify individual frames. One
straightforward interpretation of the difference between these two cases is that
in the second but not the first, the viewer perceptually represents motion.3
Yet the claim that experience represents temporal features of some sort
generates an apparent puzzle. Many have thought that if there is some period
of time during which one represents temporal features (or states of affairs
concerning such features — I’ll move between the two) then there is some
point during that period at which one does so. After all, this follows from
the apparently obvious general principle that if something is F during some
period of time then it is F at some instant during that period. But it isn’t
true in every case of temporal experience that there is a single point at which
3Such cases exhibit what is called the phi-phenomenon. See, for example, Wertheimer
1961.
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one experientially represents the relevant temporal state of affairs.4
To see this more clearly, consider a case paradigm case of temporal
experience, one in which Susan hears a sharp ping and almost immediately
afterward a dull bang. Plausibly, she thereby represents the state of affairs
there was a ping and then a bang (for short, ping then bang).5 If she did so
then there was some period of time (in fact, many) during which she did so.
Call one such duration d. The following three jointly inconsistent claims are
each plausible:
(S1) During d, Susan experientially represents ping then bang.
(S2) If, during d, Susan experientially represents ping then bang then
there is some instant at which Susan experientially represents ping then
bang.
(S3) There is no instant at which Susan experientially represents ping
then bang.6
The case is designed to be one in which (S1) is true and we’ve have good reason
to think that there are such cases. (S2) follows from the general principle
mentioned above. Yet (S3) is also quite plausible. If it is false, there is
4Unlike for perception, as one might suddenly see the bird fly off.
5An analogous example with dynamic properties would work as well (when relevant, I
treat dynamic features separately), as would an analogous example with singular contents.
6An instant is a duration-less point in time. I assume that there are instants but not
that time is dense. The main argument of this paper goes through without this assumption.
For simplicity I also assume eternalism.
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an instant at which ping then bang is experientially represented. That, in
turn, would be an instant at which both a ping and a bang are experientially
represented since in order to represent a relational state of affairs one must
represent its relata. But plausibly, there is no one instant at which Susan
experientially represents both a ping and a bang. There was no instant at
which a ping and a bang were simultaneously present in experience, not even
when Susan heard the bang.
Note that these considerations are not as plausible for all cases of expe-
riential temporal representation: perhaps one can imagine a temporal state of
affairs at an instant.Nevertheless, in many cases, the considerations in support
of (S3) are powerful. We can generalize this puzzle as follows:
(1) Over some durations, subjects experientially represent temporal
states of affairs.
(2) Whenever, over a duration, subjects experientially represent tem-
poral states of affairs, they do so at some instants (during those dura-
tions).
(3) Subjects do not always experientially represent at instants tempo-
ral states of affairs.7
One central debate regarding temporal experience consists in philosophers
leveraging two of these principles against the third. Antirealists employ (2)
7As above, in all three principles it is the representing that is over durations or at an
instant, not (necessarily) what is represented.
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and (3) to reject (1), hence arguing that no claims like (S1) are ever true.
8
It is important to keep in mind that many sensible qualities unfold over time
— throbbing, vibrato, stabbing pain — and hence generate similar puzzles.
Those who deny (1) must accept that none of these features are represented
in such cases.
Others motivate (1) and (2) against (3), claiming that whenever one
experientially represents temporal states of affairs, one does so at an instant (a
claim known as the principle of simultaneous awareness).9 Such philoso-
phers stress a distinction between the time over which one experiences some-
thing to occur — the duration of the activity of representing — and the time
one experiences it to occur over — the duration specified by the content of the
experience.10
One aim of this section is to show that this puzzle — and hence much
of the motivation for the principle of simultaneous awareness — rests on an
equivocation in (2) and (3). Few have leveraged (1) and (3) against (2), in
part because (2) is taken to be an obvious truth.11 Suitably disambiguated, it
is clear how unextrordinary it is for there to be temporal experience without
8See, for example, Chuard 2011; Podevin 2007; Reid 1785–2002.
9Philosophers who accept this principle include Brentano 1988; Broad 1925–2008; Foster
1991; Grush 2005; Husserl 1905–1964; Lee 2014b; Strawson 2009; Tye 2003.
10See, for instance, Lee 2014a, p. 149. Some such philosophers advocate for memory-
retention views according to which experientially representing temporal states of affairs is
partly constituted by remembering events that just happened (in Susan’s case, the ping).
Others defend so-called specious present views according to which experience, independent
of any memorial representation, represents a temporal duration at an instant.
11Recently some have denied the principle of simultaneous awareness, including Dainton
2000; Grube 2013; O’Shaughnessy 2000; Phillips 2008; Rashbrook 2013; Soteriou 2013.
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there being any instant at which we represent temporal states of affairs in
their entirety. The upshot of that discussion turns on the basic metaphysical
nature of experience. To begin, however, we must consider a distinction among
conditions and properties.
3.2.2 Two Kinds of Properties
When we use expressions like so-and-so experienced such-and-such, had
a such-and-such experience, or had an experience as of such-and-such, we re-
port a condition of a subject. Conditions, and reports of them, are classically
divided into two categories: states and occurrences.12 States include being
angry, brightly colored, divorced, and 74◦ as well as hating Jon and believing
that the end is nigh. Occurrences include processes like running, singing in a
choir, growing old, dissolving, melting, and digesting one’s breakfast as well
as events like having climbed the mountain, rolled to the bottom of the hill,
and run to the store. We can model conditions as properties, in part to meet
up this discussion with that of phenomenal properties.13
One crucial difference between states and occurrences is that generally
occurrences but not states are essentially ongoing. To see this distinction in
12This taxonomy originates from Kenny 1963; Vendler 1957 and the terminology from
Mourelatos 1978. The occurrence/state distinction helps us get a grip on the ongoing/non-
ongoing distinction, but the two may not perfectly match up. I set aside here what are
sometimes called achievements or instantaneous events, such as winning the race, snapping,
and popping.
13This is not a commitment to a metaphysical analysis of the three kinds of phenomena
as properties but merely a way of modeling them. That being said, such analyses are
commonplace.
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more detail, consider the state of being spherical. Suppose a lump of clay is
formed into a sphere at 2:30 and then reformed into another shape at 3:30,
having not changed shape in the interim. It is true that the clay was spherical
for that hour. Moreover, for each five minute period during that hour, the clay
was spherical during that period. The same holds for every five second period,
as well as every five millisecond period. Indeed, for every instant during that
hour, it is true that the clay was spherical at that instant.
The same holds for processes like running and moving. Suppose Jon
went for a run at 2:30pm and ran constantly for an hour.14 For every five
minute, or even five second, period during that hour, Jon was running during
that period. Moreover, for every quarter-second period during the hour, Jon
was running during that period (though of course he failed to complete even a
stride in that time — see below). Indeed, for every instant during that hour,
Jon was running at that instant. If Jon ran constantly from 2:30pm to 3:30pm
then at the instant the clock began to chime three o’clock, Jon was running.
In these respects, being spherical and running are alike.
If the lump of clay is spherical for some period, how the world is in
other respects during that period is at least nomologically sufficient for the
clay to be spherical during that period.15 Moreover, for every instant at which
the clay is spherical, how the world is in other respects at that instant is alone
14One can run for an hour without running constantly for an hour, if for instance one
stops briefly at a crosswalk.
15Perhaps how the clay is intrinsically is sufficient for it to be spherical, or perhaps it
depends on the structure of space-time during that period.
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sufficient for the clay to be spherical at that instant. That is, being a sphere
at a time nomologically supervenes on the state of the world at that time.
Yet analogous claims do not hold for running. For some spans of time
it is true both that Jon was running during that period and that the state of
the world in other respects during that period was alone insufficient for Jon to
be running during that period. Consider some quarter-second period during
Jon’s run. Jon was running during that quarter second. Nevertheless, he failed
to complete even a single stride in that time. The activity during that quarter
second was not by itself sufficient for Jon to run, despite the fact that he was
running during that period.
The same holds for instants. It is true both that Jon was running
at exactly three o’clock and that the state of the world in other respects at
exactly three o’clock was alone insufficient for Jon to be running at that time.
At exactly three o’clock, Jon was positioned in some way. But no matter how
he was positioned, his being so positioned is alone insufficient for him to be
running at that time. No matter how quickly one can take a stride, it takes
some time to run.16
The same applies to movement. If the ball is moving at exactly three
o’clock, it is not solely in virtue of how the world is in other respects at just that
time. Likewise for humming: one can be humming at exactly three o’clock,
16Perhaps there is no duration within which running cannot occur (e.g. The Flash can
always run that quickly). Nevertheless, no matter how fast he is, it takes The Flash some
time to run.
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though it takes time to hum and hence how things are at exactly three o’clock
do not alone make it true that one is then humming.
Crucially, the difference between running and being spherical charac-
terized here is not between whether something can only be F over sufficiently
long periods of time. Rather, the difference lies in what makes it the case
that one is F over relatively short periods of time.17 To be running over a
quarter-second period one must be in the midst of a stride during that period.
In this respect, running requires some temporal duration to occur. It is an on-
going property. Many properties are essentially ongoing and instantiated over
time in this way. Running, melting, rolling, humming, walking with a group,
burning, moving and digesting are all of this sort. Others are not, though of
course they maybe instantiated for some time. Call the former durative and
the latter momentary.
3.2.3 An Account of the Momentary/Durative Distinction
Let us spend some time clarifying the momentary/durative distinction
before employing it to resolve our puzzle. Everything said in this section is
independent of the general upshot of this paper, but it will help make clear
the commitments (and non-commitments) of the resulting view. Moreover, it
provides an account of the distinction that is theoretically valuable beyond its
application to temporal experience.
17Cf. Rothstein 2004, p. 14.
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One potential way to cash out the distinction is in terms of necessary
conditions concerning other times on the property being instantiated at or over
some time. On this approach, however, the qualifying necessary conditions
must be restricted in some way, as there are trivial necessary conditions of
this sort for all properties. Even besides those, many momentary properties
require for their instantiation non-trivial facts concerning other times. Being
married at t requires having participated in a marriage ceremony at some time
before t. Yet being married is not an ongoing activity. Essential properties
are also incorrectly classified as durative on this approach.
One might restrict the relevant necessary conditions by putting restric-
tions on what they concern or at which times they obtain. However, even the
strictest restrictions will not rule out all false positives. Suppose we require
that the necessary condition concern the very same property and concern the
times in the immediate temporal vicinity of the relevant instant. On this view,
a property F is durative iff necessarily, if o is F at an instant t then o is F at
t′, for some t′ in the immediate temporal vicinity of t.
On this view, the property of being married is misclassified as durative,
since one cannot be married for just an instant. If someone is married at all
then they are married for a period of time (however short). Still, being married
is not an ongoing activity like running or moving, which essentially take place
over time. It is due, rather, to features of how one can enter into and cease to
be married.
In formulating an account of durative properties we should keep in mind
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the intuitive characterization of them as properties for which being instantiated
over time is importantly prior to being instantiated at an instant. Consider
movement again: the fact that o is moving at instant t is not merely a matter
of how things are at that instant. What it is for o to move at t is for o
to move over some duration d that includes t (unlike marriage, for which
such durational facts are guaranteed but not explanatorily prior). It is hard
to see how mere necessary conditions could make sense of this distinction.
To do so we need a relation stronger than mere modal dependence - one of
metaphysical dependence. One such relation is grounding, a metaphysical
explanatory relation that (I’ll assume) holds between facts.18
A simple grounding account has it that a property is durative just
in case facts about its instantiation at a time are partly grounded in facts
about other times. Yet this also misclassifies some momentary properties as
durative. The fact that o is a heart at some point is partially grounded in facts
about the evolutionary history of the species of the creature that possesses o.
Nevertheless, being a heart is not an ongoing activity (though hearts engage
in ongoing activities). Restricting the range of times to those just around t
won’t help either. So a simple account of that sort will not suffice. Rather,
we must heed the observation above that for durative properties, durational
fact are explanatorily prior. On such a view, a property is durative just in
18See, for instance, Fine 2012; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009. It is controversial whether
metaphysical grounding is a relation between facts.
A formulation of the distinction in term of metaphysical grounding will provide insight
into how the distinction might be made in terms of other dependence relations, such as
property realization, essential properties, and fundamentality relations among events.
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case facts about it being instantiated over a period partly ground facts about
it being instantiated at instants during that period.19 More precisely,
Durative Grounding (DG) a property F is durative iff some fact of
the form [F (o) at t] is partly grounded in a fact of the form [F (o) for
d] for some duration d 3 t.20
On this account, the fact that Jon was running at 3:30 is grounded in the fact
that Jon was running over some period that includes 3:30.21 Compare this to a
view on which the instantaneous facts are grounded in facts about some other
activity around that time. On such a view, the fact that Jon was running at t
is grounded in the fact that Jon was, for instance, positioned in certain ways
around and at t. On such a view there are no fundamental durative properties
— properties the facts about the instantiation of which are ungrounded. DG
allows for such properties since it is silent on what, if anything, grounds the
durational facts (i.e. the facts of the form [F (o) over d]). This is a virtue of
DG, if for no other reason than that it does not preclude theories on which
experience is a fundamental property.
19This does not require diacronic grounding relations but only syncronic grounding rela-
tions between facts concerning different times.
20A related view has it that a plurality of facts of the form ‘o is F at ti’ (for all ti in the
relevant duration) together ground the fact that o is F at t. For various reasons, I prefer
the present principle.
21For properties like movement any duration will do. For those like running, the period
must be one in which some amount of activity took place. For many durative properties the
duration must just contain a sufficient amount of some activity. If Jon was running from
3:00 to 4:00, the fact that he was running at exactly 3:30 isn’t grounded in the fact that he
was running for the entire hour. Rather, it is grounded in a fact about him running around
that time.
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This allows us to distinguish two senses in which durative properties
can be instantiated. In some cases a durative property is instantiated at/over
some time in virtue of its being instantiated over some longer, encompassing
period. In other cases it is instantiated over a period not in virtue of being
instantiated over an encompassing period. Let us say that in the former case
the property is partly instantiated over that period while in the latter case
it is wholly instantiated over the period. Jon wholly runs over a five minute
period but partly runs over a .005 second period, and only partly runs at
exactly three o’clock. More precisely,
Partial Instantiation (PI) o is partly F over d/at t iff [F (o) over
d/at t] is grounded in a fact of the form [F (o) over d′] for some period
d′ 3 d/t.
Otherwise o is wholly F over d/at t. Momentary properties are always wholly
and never partly instantiated while durative properties are sometimes wholly
and sometimes partly instantiated, depending on the period in question.
3.2.4 A Solution
Applying this distinction to our original puzzle, there are two ways to
take the claim that S experientially represents that p: as the claim that S
wholly experientially represents that p and as the claim that S partly experi-
entially represents that p. Consequently there is an ambiguity in our original
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puzzle. (1) clearly means wholly experientially represents, but (2) and (3)
can be taken in two ways, resulting in two inconsistent triads:
(1w) Over some durations, subjects wholly experientially represent
temporal states of affairs.
(2ww) Whenever, over a duration, subjects wholly experientially rep-
resent temporal states of affairs, they wholly do so at some instants
(during those durations).
(3w) Subjects do not always wholly experientially represent temporal
states of affairs at instants.22
and
(1w) Over some durations, subjects wholly experientially represent
temporal states of affairs.
(2wp) Whenever, over a duration, subjects wholly experientially rep-
resent temporal states of affairs, they partly do so at some instants
(during those durations).
(3p) Subjects do not always partly experientially represent temporal
states of affairs at instants.
22As before, the duration here is that of the representing, not of what is represented.
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If experience is a momentary property, as many have assumed, then by PI there
is no partial experiential representation; if Susan ever represents ping then
bang then she wholly does so. That is, if experientially representing is always
momentary then experientially representing that p is wholly experientially
representing that p, (2ww) is true and original dilemma results.
23 §§3.3.1-3.3.3
confront arguments for the view that all experiential properties are momentary.
If, however, experience is a durative property of subjects then (2ww)
is false. It isn’t always true that if you wholly experientially represent that p
over a duration then you wholly experientially represent that p at some instant
during that time. There is thus no pressure to deny (3w) in the first puzzle.
On the other hand, (2wp) is true (and is the intuitive principle we observed
in §3.2.1). However, (3p) can be denied without the same consequences as
denying (3w). Recall that one reason given above for accepting (3) was that
if it is false then when Susan experientially represents ping then bang she does
so at an instant and hence experientially represents a ping and a bang at that
instant, which is not the case. However, this inference only holds for wholly
experientially representing that p and hence is only a consideration against
(3w). That (3p) is false does not entail that there is an instant at which
Susan experiences both a ping and a bang.
Consider an analogy with cinematic representation. Films represent
temporal features - they no more solely represent snapshot-like states of af-
23The momentary theorist will of course deny both (2wp) and (3p) in the second puzzle.
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fairs than dot-matrix images solely represent shading at points.Yet the analog
of (3w) for film is false. For instance, a scene in which a dog barks and then,
a moment later, a cat meows represents bark then meow. But no single in-
stant during that scene is one at which bark then meow is wholly represented.
Rather, there is a period of time over which bark then meow is wholly repre-
sented and hence at some instants during that time, bark then meow is partially
represented. So the analog of (3p) is true for film. Yet it does not follow from
this, the fact that the film partly represents bark then meow at a time, that it
represents a bark and a meow at that time.
Take another example of a temporally distributed representation: morse
code. Suppose some signals sent over a duration d represent that the battle is
won. Some portions of d won’t contain activity that by itself represents that
the battle is won, so the signals do not wholly represent that the battle over
those portions. In fact, some portions of d won’t contain activity that by itself
represents anything at all, so the signals do not wholly represent anything over
those portions. Nevertheless, the activity during all portions of d are parts of
the total activity over d (which does wholly represent that the battle is won)
so the signal does partly represent that the battle is won over those portions
of d.
Durative representation can also be understood by analogy with some
forms of spatial representation. Portraits represent spatial relations between at
least some of the things they represent. For instance, a portrait might represent
69
that a mouth is below a nose.24 So there is a spatial state of affairs it represents,
mouth below nose. Moreover, some parts of the canvas represent mouth below
nose, including some contiguous portions of the canvas that encompasses the
portion that represents the mouth and the portion that represents the nose.
However, at least some parts of such contiguous portions do not by themselves
represent mouth below nose, though they do contribute to the whole portion
so representing.
I advocate the following:
The Durative View (DV) Some phenomenal properties are dura-
tive.
On this view, sometimes one experientially represents a state of affairs over a
period of time without wholly representing it at any point during that time.
DV can straightforwardly explain the representation of any feature, dynamic
or otherwise, that generates a puzzle analogous to the one presented here,
including those regarding change in volume, pain intensity, and flavor.
So far I have avoided using the count-noun ‘experiences.’ We can,
though, express DV in such terms. Experiences are a kind of event (i.e. that
of a subject instantiating a phenomenal property). Susan has a half-second
experience, an event of representing ping then bang. But as with events gen-
erally, temporal parts of that experience — especially instantaneous parts —
24Assuming the content of a portrait is propositional. Analogous claims can be made for
non-propositional content.
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needn’t themselves also be events of experientially representing ping then bang.
Not all of the temporal parts of the event of Jon’s run are themselves runs.
Not every temporal part of a car crash is itself a car crash. Likewise, not all
temporal parts of Susan’s half-second experience of ping then bang are them-
selves experiences of ping then bang. Even supposing that the temporal parts
of Susan’s experience are themselves experiences, it needn’t be that those parts
are moreover experiences in which ping then bang is represented. Experiences
have temporal parts but the latter do not always inherit the properties of the
former.
Though this discussion has been put in terms of intentionalism, DV is
available to non-intentionalists. Theories of experience are theories of the na-
ture and structure of phenomenal properties. There are non-representational
durative properties, and it is open to, for instance, näıve realists, enactivists,
sense-data theorists, and adverbialists to identify phenomenal properties with
them.25
3.3 The Durative View
Put briefly, the durative view is the view that experience is at least
sometimes irreducibly temporally extended — that the phenomenal proper-
ties one instantiates over a period do not always reduce to the phenomenal
25In fact, enactivists often frame their views as chiefly opposed to a so-called snapshot
view of experience, similar in many ways to the view opposed here. See, for instance, Hurley
1998; Nöe 2004; O’Regan and Nöe 2001.
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properties they instantiate at each point during that period. In §3.2 I pre-
sented an argument for this view on the basis of its ability to dissolve a puzzle
about temporal experience. DV is also relevant to more general issues regard-
ing experience, as seen in §3.4. Below I consider three objections to DV. But
first I address a few potential misunderstandings of the view.
To begin, recall the definition of durative properties established earlier:
DG a property F is durative iff some fact of the form [F (o) at t] is
partly grounded in a fact of the form [F (o) for d] for some duration
d 3 t.
First recall that DG is only a claim of partial grounding. It is consistent with
a property being durative that other facts ground facts about its instantiation.
For instance, in order to be running at a time one must have certain intentions
at or around that time. If so, facts about having such intentions plausibly also
ground the fact that one is running at a time.
Since this view says nothing about what grounds durational facts it
is not committed to durative properties being dynamic, i.e. requiring some
change in their object. Some durative properties are not dynamic: constant
humming and droning are both durative but instantiating them does not ne-
cessitate change in an object. DV does not entail that experience is always
changing.
In fact, DV does not even entail that all phenomenal properties are dur-
ative, only that some are. Consider an analogous question for other durative
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representational kinds. Many have thought that only some cinematic represen-
tational properties are durative and that whatever else they represent, for the
brief period during which a single frame is displayed, a film represents what
that frame represents and does so like a picture (that is, via a momentary
property). On this view, cinematic representation consists at least partly in a
succession of snapshot-like momentary representation.
Other representational kinds do not ever represent momentarily in this
way. Transmitting information via morse code requires producing a represen-
tational signal. Yet there are no snapshot-like representational properties of
the signal. All of its representational features are durative. Morse code is an
irreducibly durative representational medium.
Correspondingly, one version of DV is the pure durative view accord-
ing to which all phenomenal properties are durative. Granted, if phenomenal
properties are not fundamental then facts about their being instantiated over
a duration must be grounded in some facts or other. But they needn’t be
grounded in facts about momentary representational properties. Another ver-
sion of DV is the impure durative view according to which some phenomenal
properties are momentary. One natural version of such a view has it that expe-
rience consists in a sequence of momentary representational properties which
ground durative representational properties, much like how on some views the
frames of a film give rise to the film’s additional representational features.
Another has it that experience consists in both both durative and momentary
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representation but that there is no grounding relation between the two.26
One might claim that if we experientially represent momentary prop-
erties then we do so via momentary representational properties and hence not
all phenomenal properties are durative. But this does not follow. One rep-
resents the smoothness of a surface by moving a part of one’s body over it.
The property represented is momentary but it is represented via a durative
phenomenal property.
These have been mostly clarifications of the view. Let us more now to
more substantive problems.
3.3.1 Temporal Mirroring
An objection one might raise against DV is that it entails a false prin-
ciple about the relationship between the temporal features of experience and
the temporal features represented in experience. In general, a representation
of F need not itself be F . A representation of a dog, lime green, or 75◦ need
not itself be a dog, lime green, or 75◦. Yet some philosophers argue that expe-
riences of duration themselves must have duration. Moreover, they claim that
the temporal features represented in experience match the temporal features
instantiated by experience.27 For instance, if one experiences a particular pe-
26There is even a version of impure DV that allows for both momentary and durative
representation of temporal features in experience. In fact, there is reason to think that
we represent temporal features in two ways, corresponding to drop-offs in preservation of
temporal information beyond 150-300ms and beyond 2-3 seconds. A combined view is well
placed to explain this.
27This must be modified in various ways. See Phillips 2014; Soteriou 2010.
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riod of time to pass then it took just that long to do so. Some examples used
above may suggest that proponents of DV are committed to such a claim.
DV does not entail a mirroring thesis. Consider again film. The tempo-
ral features of a film need not match the temporal features represented in the
film. Films include jumps in time, flashbacks, slow-motion and time-reversal
sequences, as well as periods during which no temporal passage is represented
at all (as when things are represented as frozen in time). These are all cases
where the temporal features of a film come apart from the temporal features
they represent. In the case of morse code this separation is even more appar-
ent. The temporal features represented by a morse code signal rarely have
any interesting connection with the temporal features of the signal. As far as
DV goes, experiential representation might be like film or morse code in this
respect.
Insofar as all representation takes place in time, there is a general con-
nection between vehicle and content: in order to represent a temporal property
something must instantiate some temporal property or other. But the same
holds for spatial representation; insofar as all representation takes place in
space, in order to represent a spatial property something must instantiate
some spatial property or other. These principles reflect general facts about
what is required to exist in a spatial or temporal world, not anything in par-
ticular about the nature of representation.
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3.3.2 Stream of Consciousness
It is sometimes argued that mental representation is not continuous in
a certain respect, and such complaints might be extended to show that no
mental representation is durative. Discussions of this issue generally center
around an objection from Geach against the idea of a Jamesean stream of
consciousness.28 Geach is specifically concerned with thought but his points
generalize to other forms of mental representation.
One of Geach’s main claims is that one does not mentally represent
that p over a period by mentally representing parts of the content p over parts
of that period. For instance, in thinking that Fido chased Sookie one does not
first represent Fido, and then chasing, and then Sookie. Applied to experience
(and formulated in terms of grounding), Geach claims
Geach’s Constraint (GC) experientially representing that p is not
a property F such that at least some facts of the form [F (o) over d] are
grounded in facts of the form [F ′(o) over d′]
(where d′ ∈ d and F ′ is the property of representing a part of what F is a
property of representing).
Let us suppose that Geach is right that experiential representation is
not successive in this way. DV does not by itself conflict with this observa-
tion. It is consistent with DV that durational facts about experience are not
28Geach 1969, p. 34, James 1890.
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grounded in facts about successive representing, and thus it isn’t true that one
represents that p over d in virtue of representing logical parts of the content p
over parts of d.29
Putting too much stock in the analogy between durative representation
and film may lead one to think that all durative representation must be suc-
cessive in the way GC rules out. Yet other forms of durative representation
are clearly not this way, as the previous examples of morse code should make
clear. Or consider another case. Suppose that Noe asks Greg whether the two
of them can go to the beach tomorrow, to which Greg replies sure. In saying
this, Greg represented that they can go to the beach tomorrow and did so via
a durative property. It essentially takes some time for him to say that they can
go to the beach, and the entire (albeit short) time he was speaking, he was so
representing. Yet Greg did not represent that they can go by successively rep-
resenting parts of that proposition. There were no additional representational
properties successively instantiated when he said that they can go. There was
no shorter, more basic representing that gave rise to Greg representing that
they can go. Durative experiential representational properties might be like
this: they are essentially instantiated only over durations but not in virtue of
other representational properties being instantiated successively over those du-





DV is compatible with phenomenal internalism as the latter is ordinar-
ily formulated. On the standard formulation, phenomenal internalism is the
claim that phenomenal properties supervene on intrinsic properties of subjects.
Many durative properties are internal in this respect. Digesting, for instance,
is both an intrinsic and a durative property of subjects.
However, DV is incompatible with a temporal phenomenal internalist
thesis such as
Phenomenal Temporal Localism (PTL) the phenomenal proper-
ties instantiated by a subject at a time supervene on the intrinsic prop-
erties of the world at that time.
Pairs of cases will exhibit a failure of supervenience of this sort if the two
match up to some time at which one is cut short before enough activity has
taken place for the durative property to be instantiated. For example, two
runners spring from the blocks but one trips half way through her first stride.
She was never running, though her twin was running as soon as she sprang
from the block. A bit more abstractly, there are also so-called Russell World
Scenarios in which the world sprang into existence part-way through when a
given durative property would otherwise have been instantiated.30
30See Phillips 2008.
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Fortunately, PTL is false.31 Experience is realized by mental activity
and mental activity (indeed, all activity) is durative. This alone does not guar-
antee that experience is durative — let us grant that a momentary property
can be realized by a durative one.32 Still, it does guarantee that whether one
is experientially representing that p at a time at least requires that the mental
activity that realizes such representation was going on just before or just after
that time.and in such a way that if that activity hadn’t occurred then the
representational property would not have been instantiated. So PTL is false
regardless of whether DV is true.
We might explain away the temptation to accept PTL by pointing out
that a related claim holds, namely that someone can identify which phenom-
enal properties they instantiate at a time without knowing what occurred at
other times.33 I can know that I am digesting without first knowing anything
about the state of my digestive system in the past or future. DV is compatible
with this claim.
Some intentionalists have an additional reason to accept at least the
possibility of durative experiential representation. It is empirically possible
that the information output by the relevant perceptual processing mechanisms
31As are analogous claims for non-mental and non-phenomenal mental forms of represen-
tation.Note that non-mental forms of representation (e.g. speech, film, morse code) clearly
violate it as do non-phenomenal mental states (e.g. calculating the tip, thinking through a
proof, running through a mental list).
32This would be possible if facts about realized properties don’t inherit the grounds of
facts about their realizers.
33See Pautz 2014 for a similar discussion.
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is temporally encoded. Many intentionalists are committed to the claim that
such information is (or is intimately related to) experiential content. So such
theorists should accept that DV is an empirical possibility.34
3.4 Conclusion
My main goal has been to argue for a view according to which expe-
rience is sometimes an irreducibly temporally extended phenomenon — that
how things are for a subject over a period of time does not reduce to how
things are for them at each point during that period. I hope to have shown
here that this often overlooked view is theoretically viable and resolves certain
longstanding philosophical problems and confusions.
I want to end by gesturing at an additional upshot of the momentary/
durative distinction. Philosophers of mind are especially concerned with so-
called personal-level mental phenomena, those which are properly attributed
to subjects rather than their parts (e.g. their cognitive systems). Personal-
level mental phenomena include believing that the end is nigh, hoping for a
brighter future, feeling a shooting pain up the thigh, loving Leonard Cohen,
tasting ripe pineapple, fearing for one’s life, and listening to crickets.
Personal level mental phenomena are often divided into so-called occurr-
ent and standing kinds: believing that the end is nigh and loving Leonard
Cohen are standing while feeling a shooting pain in the thigh and tasting
34See, for instance, Dainton 2014; Lee 2014b.
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ripe pineapple are occurrent. Personal-level mental phenomena are also often
distinguished into phenomenal and non-phenomenal kinds: feeling a shoot-
ing pain up the thigh and imagining a brilliant sunset are phenomenal while
believing that the end is nigh and loving gin are not.
I have introduced a third distinction, between momentary and durative
mental phenomena. As we saw above, mental phenomena like believing that
the end is nigh and loving Leonard Cohen are momentary properties. I have
argued that at least some phenomenal properties are durative and similar
arguments could be extended to almost all phenomenal properties, including
non-perceptual experience like inner monologue and imagination.
The paradigmatic examples on either side of these three distinctions
are the same. This suggests a simple view, namely that among personal-
level mental states the occurrent/standing distinction, the phenomenal/non-
phenomenal distinction, and the durative/momentary distinction line up.35
35Crane 2013; Soteriou 2013 suggest related claims. Cf. Bartlett 2017.
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Nöe, Alva (2004). Action in Perception. MIT Press.
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